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THE MORAL ECONOMY OF AUTHORITY AMONG 
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Abstract: In this chapter, we aim to outline, in the realm of the possible, the 
parameters of the field of Muslim authority in Hungary. For this purpose, it is 
appropriate to apply three types of approaches: first a conceptual study which 
analyses some key concepts (those of authority and legitimacy, in particular) 
from the perspective of the socio-anthropology of Islam. The next step is a longer 
exercise of mapping the sources of legitimacy among Hungarian Muslims. We 
do this second exercise following a back-and-forth movement between Islam in 
Hungary, Muslim societies and Islamic doctrines, all of which are contributing 
factors to the structures of authority and modes of legitimating that explain the 
production and obedience to authority among Hungarian Muslims. A final eth-
nographic approach describes and analyses debates between Hungarian Mus-
lim women on the authority to decide over questions such as the problematic of 
legitimate preachers, celebrating birthdays in the family and female beauty care. 
The aim of the article is to examine the legitimacy of symbolic capital that 
allows Hungarian Islamic figures to claim the status of the authority and to ini-
tiate the production of this authority and to conduct an authorization process. 
From the outset, therefore, we raise the question of the moral economy1 of author-
ity in Islam in Hungary. We base our study on observations and interviews with 
members of the two major Hungarian Muslim communities: A Magyarországi 
Muszlimok Egyháza and Magyar Iszlám Közösség.
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1  Joakim Sandberg defines moral economy as “a. a set of moral or values-based attitudes or beliefs 
concerning economic agents, practices or structures that are shared by a certain population or group 
and (b) the actualization or institutionalization of these attitudes in a certain social practice or struc-
ture, common tradition or general ‘way of life’ of the population”. See: Sandberg 2015. 177.
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Conceptual framework I: The concept of authority
According to Max Weber, the authority is the probability that a command with 
a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of people.2 This notion 
is operative, but must be qualified in the Muslim contexts. Often individuals do 
not follow a particular authority all the time, or in any situation. Thus, Hungarian 
Muslims might change affiliation, mosque or outright stop attending mosques, 
as they disagree with the discourses preached by imams in the mosques; they 
can also change their affinity to the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafis, Sufi or 
otherwise. In this respect, the turnover of the authorities is not surprising. Some 
prominent members of the Magyarországi Muszlimok Egyháza were earlier mem-
bers of the Magyar Iszlám Közösség, and left it to establish themselves as independ-
ent authorities.
F. Peter (for French Islam) and T. G. Jensen (for Danish Islam) have shown that 
religious authorities are persons or institutions involved on a regular or profes-
sional basis in the authorization of Islam.3 The authority inflates as a configuration 
because it is relational and contingent.4 Thus, authority takes place at the junction 
between discourses and audiences, assuming the role of authorizing beliefs and 
practices, which are favourably received by audiences. It, therefore, appears that 
where some see the fragmentation of authority as a synonym of decay, and thus 
of degeneration and weakness, it is in reality a flexibility required for the recon-
figuration and the regeneration of a field of authority. In other words, this rela-
tional character deploys both a capacity of structuring and restructuring, inher-
ent, as it stands, to the Islamic field of authority.
The positioning of authority is constantly changing. For the first generation of 
immigrant workers arriving in Europe, for example, the authority of the Imam 
tended to be minimal, based on a minimalist and limited moral economy also 
in the first group of workers gathered around relatives, village or region of ori-
gin. This minimalist and local moral economy is based on small donations by 
the small groups of immigrants. It is also noteworthy that this first generation 
of Muslims were economically a manpower of the European economies, fully 
employed, and therefore, their moral economy was relatively dominated, even 
in their daily lives, by market economy. The exile of the Islamist associations, 
and the influence of Muslim countries among other factors, and especially the 
family reunion policy (establishing the first anchor of an autonomous local moral 
economy, the family) have created different expectations of the imam, now at the 
heart of a more complex moral economy, supported by international funds and 
more powerful communities; the expectations cannot remain the same for the 
2  Weber 1978. 53.
3  Peter 2006. 708–709; Jensen 2006. 643.
4  Krämer – Schmidtke 2006. 2.
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third generation whose relationship to authorities in the host society and religion 
is different.
The Conceptual Framework II: The notion of legitimacy
In the theological and Sunni legal doctrine, legitimacy was formed around three 
pillars: scriptural texts, the consensus of jurists and community,5 which all empha-
size the idea of unity. As Mr. Sulok expressed it, the unity of Islam is guaranteed 
by the unity of creed. However, the norm cannot exist but as a result of a social, 
economic or political process of which it stands as a norm. Thus, in its religious 
and social history, Sunnism mobilized other legitimacies outside or with these 
three pillars, such as charisma, social reproduction or action. When an authority 
figure uses a Sunni doctrinal legitimacy, it does so in relation to a social anchor, 
and to a moral economy which sanctifies it social and religious legitimacy.6
In this context, the thesis of normative justification developed by J. Raz helps 
us to understand better the common Sunni reference of legitimacy. According to 
Raz, legitimacy is a moral force which is justified within acceptable moral reasons 
for the subject: the latter agrees that someone exercises power over him insofar as 
he accepts that the holder of power is best suited to deal with matters concerning 
the subject. Thus, the subject is willing to entrust the management of its affairs to 
the person in power, rather than managing them himself.7
Therefore, the legitimacy has a social function, that of justifying the submis-
sion or contesting an order seen as the best possible world or the world to change. 
For audiences to adhere to any normative justification, a discourse built on the 
basis of mere assumptions, reasonable or morally justifiable, it is necessary that 
these audiences see in it the greatest benefit for the largest number (of members). 
Hence the moral economy is inseparable from the Sunni legitimacy and therefore 
of Islam: the discourse of legitimacy reflects a discourse on the moral economy 
and vice versa. The legitimacy of discourses circulating among Muslims in Hun-
gary can maintain and produce meaning only insofar as they are useful to the 
moral economy of the concerned Muslims. Intrinsic to the idea of  justification, 
which is epistemological as well as moral, and even cultural in the most basic 
sense, there is a process of construction and selection. In all Sunni discourses of 
legitimacy, figures of authority build from selected elements a posture of legiti-
macy, without jeopardizing the common foundation of Sunni legitimacy. 
In addition to the normative justification, the Sunni legitimacy must ensure 
sustainability and spatiality; it must function over time, or it may collapse. This 
5  Belhaj 2010. 63–65; Schuck 2013. 485–506.
6  Sharon 1984. 121–141; Décobert 2004. 23–44; Filali-Ansary 2015. 72–92. 
7  Hershovitz 2003. 206. 
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failure indicates, in the end, the lack of resources, which challenges the moral 
economy of the community, which will turn to another authority figure. For legit-
imacy to operate sustainably, it must be rooted in social structures and, therefore, 
in a place; for example, the legitimacy of the action may not work in reality only 
if it is exercised in a place reserved for it. It is for this reason that mosques and 
Muslim associations multiply, not because of the number of believers who need 
worship places. Since the field is segmentary and mimetic, in order to establish 
their credibility and to justify their legitimacy, even a couple of active people - in 
quest for a place in the moral economy of the community - need to dispose of a 
religious place. The offer to establish a congregational place might be in advance 
of the demand, because creating such place might be connected to the will to initi-
ate a centre of preaching Islam. Thus the offer creates the demand, and creates an 
opportunity for other mimetic and competing offers. 
A discourse on legitimacy discards another discourse on legitimacy and, sub-
sequently, a conflict of legitimacies is inevitable. In the Sunni world, the legiti-
macy of discourses tends to converge, while maintaining always a kind of diver-
gence in check, with the exception of radical Salafism, which is soon excluded 
by the mainstream Sunnism. The Sunni discourse on legitimacy is, above all, a 
discourse of expansion and exclusion: 1. expansion because it reflects the will 
of the community, and the number that must necessarily increase so that the 
strength of the argument increases. 2. And exclusion as any other discourse 
that “deviates” from the base of legitimacy endangers the growing community. 
Not only the Sunni legitimacy has a phobia of minorities, Shiites or others, but 
especially in a European context it has a phobia of difference and diversity. Any 
Islamic legitimacy of discourse is ultimately a discourse against integration and 
diversity.
The sources of Sunni legitimacy
To establish their legitimacy, Sunni actors employ four main strategies: charisma, 
social reproduction, religious knowledge and action. Few preliminary remarks 
about the four legitimacies should be made here. First, that they are flexible and 
adaptable resources, and can be used together or separately depending on the situ-
ation of discourse or action. Furthermore, the mobilization of these resources meets 
the qualifications or skills of a figure of authority. It is a social daily trial and error 
process in which the actor learns to highlight the resource that makes it capitalize 
the most influence. Finally, we included the pillars of the Sunni doctrinal legiti-
macy in the mode of legitimating by religious knowledge because it is through a 
scholarly tradition that the scriptural sources, the consensus of jurists or commu-
nity agreement are, from a socio-anthropological point of view, intelligible.  
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1) Charisma8
Charismatic authority played a vital role in the emergence and development of 
Islam.9 The Sunni traditionalists who have written the history of the first three 
centuries of Islam wanted, in particular, to highlight the charisma of the commu-
nity, probably too disappointed with the state of Islam in the 9th century. Addi-
tionally, the schisms in the different Islamic sects, Sunni, Shiite or Sufi, histori-
cal and contemporary, reflect a segmental logic around a figure of authority that 
claims to revive the true Islam.10 Managers or the heirs of the charismatic figure 
mobilize various strategies to preserve the charisma of the founder, in order to 
preserve the gains that charisma generates.11
One can designate the Sunni charisma as a recurrent mimetic movement: the 
famous Sunni mimetic of the Prophet through his sunna which is both the prac-
tice of the Prophet and reproduction of this practice. The imitation of the Prophet 
is highly recommended, if not compulsory; it is a rewarding act, albeit very 
demanding. The Prophet is an inexhaustible charismatic resource, many figures 
of authority, the ʻulama and Sufi masters in particular, but also intellectuals, con-
stantly rebuild, and take “a shade of the Prophetic light” (qabas min al-nubuwwa) 
for their benefit. The descendants of the Prophet, the Sufis, the traditionalists and 
the martyrs of jihad, all fascinated by the Prophet; they use voluntarily this legiti-
macy resource.12 
From the moment a person adheres to ahl al-sunna, it reasserts the need for a 
charismatic legitimacy. The candidate to the authority will be compared to the 
Prophet. The establishment of Islamic bonds of brotherhood or umma is concomi-
tant to the charisma of the Sunna as this prophetic charisma emphasizes the cha-
risma of the community. In other words, there is a correlation between the supply 
of charisma that seeks to create a community, and the need of charisma in a Sunni 
community.13 The “cult of the Prophet” , which also has pronounced manifesta-
tions among Hungarian Muslims is a symbol of the quest for charisma. 
The largest section on the website of the Magyarországi Muszlimok Egyháza is 
dedicated to the Prophet Muhammad: 215 documents on the Prophet’s life and 
teachings, the function of which is less to inform than to connect the audience to 
the source of Sunni charisma. In Mr Sulok’s words “One cannot follow the sunna 
without the sira”. The head of the community described the Prophet as a role 
model and intermediary for Muslims in everything. Mr. Sulok lists justice as 
the most important characteristic of the Prophet and explains the emphasis on 
8  We use the notion of charisma defined as “a power of personal authority such as to allow one to 
lead people or inspire devotion […] authority derives from the volition of the leader’s followers, 
rather than from legal status or tradition”. Morris 2012. 35. 
9  Lindholm 2012. 177–84.
10  Geaves 2009. 37–60. 
11  Stenberg 2008. 65–73. 
12  Bergmann 2008. 467–479. 
13  Geaves 1996. 169–192. 
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the history of the 7th century by stating that the Prophet committed no mistakes as 
opposed to later Muslims. 
However, Mr. Sulok distances himself from celebrating the Prophet’s birth-
day, mawlid nabawī. His argument is that the sunna, that is the sayings and the 
acts of the Prophet himself, do not promote this celebration; it was invented cen-
turies later, and as such it is “violation of the sunna”. The love of the Prophet 
should appear in following his teachings as he puts it. We asked our interviewee 
whether the person who follows the Prophet does not have by extension the high-
est authority in the community, and he discarded such thing. He prefers to call 
it respect and trust: the more a person resembles the Prophet, the more it gains 
respect and trust in the community. We also asked him whether the Prophetic 
charisma is not a collective charisma, in the sense that his charisma is embedded 
in that of the community, and that is probably why orthodox Sunnis do not cel-
ebrate the Prophet’s celebration; he saw no point in our question.
The head of the Magyarországi Muszlimok Egyháza told us an interesting state-
ment about charisma, namely that “charisma is valid within the confines of the 
sharia”, which in his understanding means that a charismatic figure might be 
legitimate in Islam, and Sunni Islam in particular, only if it respects the bound-
aries of sharia, and does not infringe on the law. He stressed that sharia is the 
framework and they operate inside of it confines. Implicit in his argument is 
the conflict between traditionists and theologians-jurists on the one hand and the 
Sufis on the other. The latter claimed a charismatic authority, to which the former 
responded by requiring this authority to be controlled by sharia. Thus, the head 
of the Magyarországi Muszlimok Egyháza admits the need for a charismatic figure 
to be a guide, but within the confines of sharia.
In Hungary, four figures enjoy some charisma in the two major Sunni com-
munities. The website of Magyar Iszlám Közösség lists three charismatic figures: 
Gyula Germanus (d. 1979), alias Julius Abdulkerim Germanus, an Orientalist and 
Muslim convert. On the first page of Magyar Iszlám Közösség’s website, two old 
videos of his speeches are displayed, to celebrate the aura of the “founder” and 
that of the community. The head of the Magyarországi Muszlimok Egyház does not 
contest his charisma, but emphasized the fact that he was not a traditional Islamic 
scholar, a familiar argument against orientalists. Two additional figures of the 
same community are Balázs Mihálffy and Zoltán Bolek. The first is the founder 
of the Magyar Iszlám Közösség (1988) and the second is his successor, founding 
the mosque of this community in 1996. Implicitly, the head of the Magyarországi 
Muszlimok Egyháza concedes that these three figures generate charisma, but sys-
temically judges their influence by their traditional knowledge, which he thinks 
is lacking in their cases, and their political statements and connections under-
mines their credibility as religious authorities. As for the head of the Magyar-
országi Muszlimok Egyháza, he said he never considered himself as a charismatic 
figure. He knows, however, that people ask him about his opinions and trust it 
regarding the teachings of Islam.
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2) Body, clan and reproduction
Sunni legitimacy by reproduction is a complex historical process; the division of 
mosques along ethnic or regional or clan identities is a manifestation of this type 
of legitimacy. The first Sunni communities in Europe have reproduced a field of 
authority, around similar practices to which they were exposed in the country of 
origin. In the same vein, the Islamist leadership of European Islam reproduced 
imported patterns of thinking and doing things from their backgrounds. Once 
installed, this subsystem is reproduced, in its turn, at the junction between politi-
cal Islam and popular Islam, not identical to what is done in the home country of 
course, or what has been imported in the first place, but in a similar logic, with 
some degree of regularity. The subsystem imitates the system (or systems) of the 
country of origin while seeking autonomy (segmentarity) and installing a repro-
duction subsystem of a local authority field. The arrival of young leaders and 
the converted, currently the major players in Islam in Hungary14, do not change 
the substance of the tools or ways of thinking, in the Islamic moral economy. 
In contrast, with globalization, import takes a more pronounced pace. Trans-
national linkages established by families and clans, allow greater flexibility in 
 reproduction.
The Yemeni domination of the Magyarországi Muszlimok Egyháza can be seen 
in the board of the community’s organisation, occupied in majority by Yemenis, 
in the presidency of the mosque, also led by a Yemeni, and in that the two imams 
of the mosque of the same origin. The head of the Magyarországi Muszlimok Egy-
háza acknowledges the Yemeni domination over the community, and considers 
it an accident caused by a historical fact. He explains it by the active character of 
 Muslim Yemenis who contrary to other immigrants from the Middle East, stayed 
in Hungary and invested in religion and studies while other immigrants either 
went back to their countries after their studies or abandoned studies and started 
business, ignoring religious action. Also, it is attributable to their competence 
which in the process of selection set them apart from the Egyptians, for example. 
3) Religious knowledge as capital
Although the meaning and the level of Islamic knowledge to be acquired is a 
subject of debate, it is a major source of legitimacy in Sunni Islam because the link 
between the founding community and future generations is established through 
the transmission a symbolic heritage, the sunna. This is often a travesty of the 
original knowledge to the extent that the origin is an invention or imagination of 
the 9th century by the same representatives of the sunna. One common question 
14  The head of the Magyarországi Muszlimok Egyháza is Sulok Zoltán Szabolcs (born in 1970) and that 
of the Magyar Iszlám Közösség is Bolek Zoltán (born in 1959), two converts.
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we find in the Salafi discourse, and other Islamist or Islamic discourse is the crite-
rion according to which it is possible to distinguish between good and evil schol-
ars (the distinction is inherent to the moral economy of legitimacy). This conflict 
of religious knowledge opposes Salafists, the most traditionist of Sunni groups, to 
other Sunni interpretations, and divides the Salafists themselves. 
In the field of Sunni authority, the question is not about a religious knowledge 
itself, but about a discursive legitimacy that is to say the ability to transform, 
using a network of resources, the study of some texts, often within the range of 
a hundred pages, into ‘ilm, a hallowed legacy. The authorization given, with or 
without transparency, for sheikhs or peers, is more important than the number of 
texts, depth of control, or the spirit of research, or even the quality of the memory 
of the scholar.15
The Magyarországi Muszlimok Egyháza highlights religious knowledge, Arabic 
language, books, videos on Islam, Friday sermons, questions and answers, Islamic 
studies, literature, etc. in its website as well as in its daily missionary work. The 
most cherished capital in this community is the knowledge of sharia, the most 
sacred knowledge, and the source of charisma, and the “foundational imagined 
community”. The legitimacy of a person in the religious service depends on 
his skills in this religious knowledge. In Hungary, no mufti is appointed by the 
state. There are the shuyūkh, the religious masters, some of which, as the head 
of the community Magyarországi Muszlimok Egyháza, told us attended the level 
of independent intellectual activity, ijtihād, a highly contested claim; these mas-
ters deliver opinions about religious matters. Among the shuyūkh, the mufti, is 
the person who “officially” answers the questions of people on religious mat-
ters, and therefore constitutes the primary authority in the mosque. The imams 
have a practical function to assume, that of the daily religious service, mainly 
the prayers. The shuyūkh and the imams have certificates of religious knowledge 
from higher Islamic institutes in the Muslim world, especially from Yemen. There 
is also a qāri’, a reciter of the Quran who teaches children the Quran and reads 
the Quran during Ramadan, a less prestigious position. The head of the Magyar-
országi Muszlimok Egyháza insists that the authority acquired by all these persons 
does not only depend on their religious knowledge, but also on their morality. 
The knowledge and the morality (‘ilm wa akhlāq) of the candidates to religious 
authority are assessed and authorized by the board of the community’s organiza-
tion. Mr. Sulok emphasized following the soundest opinion based on evidence 
(dalīl). He condemns the non-following of any juridical school, la-madhhabiyya 
which he considers to be a case of “going back to starting point zero”. 
15  Eickelman 2015. 135–145; Mandaville 2007. 224–243. 
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4) Legitimacy by action
As Weber puts is, the actions are symptoms and underlying expressions of per-
sonal ethics.16 The Islamic ethics of action follow the divine commands, which 
encompass the daily rules and ethical practices of the life of a good Muslim. These 
rules of conduct are necessary for salvation, and cannot be known by independ-
ent reason as suggested by the Mu’tazila, but must be drawn from revelation, and 
complemented by human reasoning.17 There is a moral economy of salvation at 
stake here.18 The good Muslim is seeking the best life possible, that of the hereaf-
ter and which he prepares in the herein, and is ready to act accordingly. The rev-
elation is the guarantee of the success or failure of the action; action must, there-
fore, seek to live according to the revelation in this world. I. Lapidus noticed that 
living and knowing the truth in Sunni Islam are the two faces of the same reality. 
The quest for perfection through action, through rituals, customs or transactions, 
makes the person in the world without being of the world.19 At the same time, 
this ethics of action is temporary and transient; it sees the best reward in heaven. 
It invests in our world insofar as it is the best possible passing world, created by 
God to help us in the transition to the best world (heaven).
The legitimacy of the action does not follow a linear logic; for social actors it 
is the use of the most appropriate logic that leads to the best possible outcome in 
a given moral economy. Islam itself is a logic of action: its rituals, beliefs, myths, 
lifestyle structure the daily lives of individuals and communities, their attitudes 
and behaviours; the testimony of faith connects the individual to a community, 
and excludes him/her from another. The ritual – whether financial as almsgiving 
or bodily like prayer – is collective and presupposes social settings, such as com-
munity. The pilgrimage is a global action, and of course Ramadan changes the 
life in a Muslim neighbourhood for a month. The strategic action in these rituals 
revolves around exchange, submission and communalism.
The Magyarországi Muszlimok Egyháza is active in several fields: education, 
charity, etc. The head of this Muslim community explained to us that Islamic 
action is a way to follow the Prophet’s teachings, who asks his community to be 
active in the world. In this regard, this community organised in May 2016, the 
first fair and exhibition of Muslim businesses in Hungary20, a sort of Muslim expo, 
organised in the recent years in the UK, France and Belgium. There is probably 
one particular aspect of the Hungarian expo; it took place after the terrible moral 
panic in Hungary caused by migration waves, invading Hungarian borders and 
cities. These migration waves devastated the image of the Muslim community 
living in Hungary. Thus, this fair offers the opportunity to claim legitimacy as an 
16  Weber 1963. 155. For the legitimacy of action in European Islam, see a brief note in: Dassetto 1996. 
150. For ethics as a cultural system see: Csordas 2013. 523–546.
17  Hourani 1976. 69.
18  See in the regard: Hart 2013; Reda 2013. 441–462; Lapidus 1984. 38-61.
19  Lapidus 1984. 60.
20  I. Muszlim vállakozások Magyarországon c. börze és kiállítás http://iszlam.com/hirek/item/2394-i- 
muszlim-vallakozasok-magyarorszagon-c-borze-es-kiallitas 
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economic actor. The head of the community, Zoltán Sulok told us that “We organ-
ised the fair to let people know each other and show their products”. He asserted 
that the event is Islamic because Islam has an economic tradition, which he calls 
Islamic economy, based on justice, the prohibition of interest, riba, and halal. He 
sees the justice of Islamic economy as able to eliminate poverty and inequality. 
Islamic economy, he told us, is able to sustain development, in a world that failed 
economically, and that Islamic economy is the solution.
Debating of religious authority dilemmas among  
Hungarian converts to Islam
The diversity inherent in the institutional structure of Islam and the multiplicity 
of authorities gain special significance when, in a majority non-Islamic environ-
ment a convert has to make one’s way through a mass of legal opinions (fatwas). 
While in a traditional, Islamic context the believer follows the creed of the family 
and access to jurisprudential opinion is granted, converts face multiple difficul-
ties in finding authentic answers to the emerging dilemmas. In a minority context 
various trends present themselves and with no proper knowledge of Arabic or 
English, the convert’s opinion formation starts with logic based reasoning. How-
ever, it remains confined by the need to justify the conclusion thus reached from 
authorised sources. In what follows we examine problems faced by Hungarian 
Muslim female converts and their strategies to find authentic solutions to such 
issues. 
The cases referred to below have been discussed in a “closed” Facebook group 
for females pertaining to one of the big Muslim centres in Budapest, therefore the 
anonymity of the group and the participants is respected. The problems raised 
range from doubts regarding what the authentic Islamic practice is (e.g. in per-
forming prayer, following legal schools, credibility of religious scholars, taking 
the Prophet as role model for the believer) through proper – moral –  behaviour 
(especially regarding female-male relations, dress code) to various daily issues 
(such as health care, celebrations, bad habits such as smoking, house decora-
tions etc…). 
The fact that the focus group consists of Hungarian females, accentuates two 
factors. First, the problem of access to authoritative opinions that correspond to 
the principles of the Hanafi madhhab (legal school) followed by the mosque which 
they attend in Budapest. Second, the necessity to deal with the intrinsic feeling 
that a born Muslim or native Arab knows better, a conviction that vests their hus-
bands with a kind of religious authority over them. These traits are explicitly or 
implicitly present in all the discussions. Compared to questions published in offi-
cial fatwa providing websites, the issues discussed in the group refer to ongoing 
practices in which the person has already taken a position – although often with a 
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hint of doubt – and in the intimacy and anonymity guaranteed by the group, tries 
to acquire post-justification for her individual stance.
1) The problematic of legitimate preachers
A good example of the difficulties in discerning between authentic and manipu-
lated sources of legal opinions is the discussion about Mustafa Islamoğlu who, 
according to the first writer of the opening post “fools Muslims all over the 
world…His ideas spread like a virus and it is only a matter of time that they reach 
the Hungarian public as well.” In the following the initiator of the discussion – 
the first commentator referred to as C. 1. –  lists a number of opinions attributed 
to Islamoğlu with special emphasis on his claim that “Allah does not know the 
future”. She goes on describing how she met the disciple of Islamoğlu who “first 
said things with which I fully agreed with and emphasised that as a Turkish and 
born Muslim he deserves my trust. He supported his statements with Quranic 
verses. And here comes the problem as this method can be absolutely convincing 
for people who lack the basics of religious knowledge.” Then C. 1. addresses the 
new converts calling them “to get rid of the inferiority complex that leads us to 
think that an Arab or a Turkish knows better. On the contrary, they have a strong 
tendency to mix religion with local traditions, while for us, Hungarians it is easier 
to reach out to the clear source.” Then she links to another topic, stating “we have 
to close the debate about whether it is necessary to follow a madhhab, since it is 
a must. Everybody needs to follow one Sunni madhhab, because it completes the 
theory exposed in the Quran with the practice of the Prophet. However, it is up 
to the individual to decide which one. In general, the most applicable to urban 
life is the Hanafi School, but the choice belongs to the believer.” Here a fourth 
theme is introduced to the post: “the importance of being united and unanimous 
as a group. We can get knowledge only from authentic scholars, accepted by and 
known to the community.” At the end of the discourse C. 1. adds that the Face-
book group provides a platform for getting informed about the credited, main-
stream scholars.
The responses to the post evolve around the criteria of authenticity. C. 2. takes 
a defensive position and responds saying that she listened to the teachings of 
Islamoğlu, and she refuses to be graded as “worse Muslim” than C. 1. for this. C. 
2. claims that Islamoğlu’s statements are quoted out of context. She emphasises 
that the preacher’s discourse is fairly complicated “although after some time one 
can get used to the Arabic terms he uses”. Then she goes on criticising Harun 
Yahya – “ a Masonic” in her words – and Fethullah Gülen – “an American agent” 
according to her – and concludes that “everybody can make mistaken statements 
and one should not follow blindly one single preacher while condemning oth-
ers”. In the following C. 3. addresses C. 2. in order to explain that the discourse is 
not about labelling some as better Muslims than others, rather about the aware-
ness of whether the preaching is in line with “The [i.e. mainstream] Islam” or 
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not. Furthermore, C. 3. emphasises the duty to remind others of what one feels 
non-Islamic and harmful. Then, as she says “it is the individual’s responsibility to 
follow such teachings or refuse them.”
In the discussion we can notice crucial statements on authority and authen-
ticity. First, it states that the danger to be misled is present especially for those 
who are new to Islam and lack the basics of religion, meaning here the accepted 
rules of deduction in formulating a legal opinion. Second, the weight of being a 
born Muslim or native Arab or Turkish in judging one’s credibility is debated and 
contested. Being deprived of cultural background is presented as an advantage 
in performing a pure, non-distorted Islamic practice. However, the admitted dif-
ficulty in understanding a complicated discourse in a foreign language which is 
rich in a specific Arabic terminology implies that getting knowledge faces obsta-
cles and remains a concern to the convert. Third, the importance of following 
a madhhab (acknowledged legal school) – self-evident in a traditional environ-
ment –, a question typical of minority context is reasserted, but completed with 
two, characteristically convert arguments. One of them emphasises individual 
decision in choosing a madhhab – contrary to being born into one or following 
it by marriage -; the other is that a particular legal school – the Hanafi – is more 
adaptable to urban life than the other three – or it is better to say that urban life 
can be structured to meet the requirements of Hanafi legal system. 
Individual choice is reasserted again in the responses where its scope is 
expanded to accept or refuse false teachings. The fourth aspect is the importance 
for the micro community to be united – meaning here those who attend the same 
mosque or belong to the Facebook group – in discerning the right teachings from 
the false. If a charismatic imam with proper scholarly credentials had been pre-
sent in the community, the charisma – meaning here wisdom – of the commu-
nity was not highlighted in defining authoritative versus avoidable. Fifth, in the 
responses, the anxiety over being a good Muslim emerges coupled with the fear 
of being labelled as worse or less Muslim as a result of an individual choice. This 
concern together with the conviction that a mainstream Islam exists, sets a stand-
ard from which individual reasoning, freedom of choice and undertaking respon-
sibility cannot relieve the believer.
2) Celebrating birthdays in the family
Setting the routines and habits of family life and the upbringing of the next gen-
eration is the shared responsibility of the parents. In a non-Muslim minority con-
text being Muslim becomes a special concern and the lack of authentic opinion 
and common cultural background are sources of tensions between the couples. 
In the debates the born Muslim husband often claims religious authority. The fol-
lowing case describes a situation of this kind. The discussion of celebrating birth-
days in the Facebook group highlights the possibilities and confines the convert 
108
Abdessamad Belhaj – Bianka Speidl
wife faces in her quest for authentic practice when no unquestionable authorita-
tive opinion is available.
The post analysed in this section is started by a Hungarian convert lady (C.1.) 
who lives in Ireland with her Somali husband and children. C. 1. exposes her 
problem in the Facebook group asking opinions – in a complaining manner – 
about her husband’s prohibiting birthday celebrations in the family. C. 2. answers 
suggesting her to demand a hadith from her husband that explicitly prohibits 
birthday celebrations. She adds that the Prophet did not celebrate it therefore 
some consider is as bid’a. In the same section she explains that bid’a means harm-
ful innovation. In the end she claims that it is not bid’a since celebrating one’s 
birthday has nothing to do with religion. C. 3. adds that in Turkey she knew peo-
ple who condemned birthday celebration and labelled it as a Christian custom 
and argued against it in a manner that raised sense of guilt in those held it. C. 4. 
joins the discussion by quoting her Afghan and Kurdish friends who had positive 
reactions to such celebrations telling that “Allah likes nice things that make peo-
ple happy.” Then she suggests the islamqa.info webpage and adds she will inquire 
about the scholars who provide opinions there. 
C. 2. backs C. 4. in claiming that “Allah likes when people are happy, celebrat-
ing birthday is not blasphemy.” C. 5. who lives in Saudi Arabia interferes saying 
that it is a Western custom. C. 2. answers polemically: “there are many things in 
Saudi that are western customs (…) Our beloved Prophet never used air condi-
tioner. C. 5. replies saying that no one in her husband’s family knows the date of 
their birth “because the Prophet did not celebrate it. Air conditioning has noth-
ing to do with religion, it serves comfort.” C. 2. responds that the Prophet had a 
very simple life style and did not care about comfort. She goes further saying that 
superfluous luxury contradicts the Sunna (practice) of the Prophet much more 
than celebrating birthdays. And “by the way – she adds – the Prophet used to fast 
on Mondays because he was born on Monday.” C. 6. supports C. 2.’s argument by 
hadith 1162 narrated by Abu Muslim. C. 5. asks with a hint of provocation “Then 
why did the Prophet fast on Thursdays?”. C. 2. answers: “Because it was a cus-
tom” and ends the remark with a smile emoticon. C. 6. offers another explanation 
“Maybe because doomsday will happen on a Friday. But I am not sure.” 
Then they start asking C. 1. about the nationality of her husband, if he has 
always been strict in such matters. C. 1. Reveals that her husband’s family does 
not celebrate birthdays, but he became stricter after they had moved to Ireland 
from Hungary. “He changed I think because my parents are not here. Were they 
here, they would come to celebrate.” C. 2. states then: “It does not matter what 
customs they have and how they mix it with religion. You chose this and you 
have to adapt to what you have chosen. C. 7. joins the talk here asking “What 
do you mean by following a stricter trend in Islam?” C. 5. in her answer gives 
a brief and shallow description of Salafis “those don’t listen to music and their 
trousers end above their ankle” and attaches a smile emoticon. C. 8. offers to ask 
a “knowledgeable Muslima who lives in Medina and helps others.” C. 4. raises an 
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objection that “she is from Saudi too… It is declared that we follow the Hanafi 
School, while in Saudi Arabia they follow Ibn Hanbal at least this is what I found 
on the Wikipedia.” C. 8. reminds that “hadith is a hadith.” C. 2. contests warning 
that “Yes but it matters who interprets it and what reads into it.” C. 8. Takes the 
polemic further declaring that “Following a specific trend is an error. The purest 
is to follow the Holy Quran and the Hadith. How could we know which preacher 
is right and which one is wrong? And why Muslims are divided into sects? If 
something is not mentioned [in the Quran and in the hadith], it means it is bor-
rowed from other cultures and therefor it is haram (forbidden). C. 2. Asks back: 
“Can you interpret the Quranic verses and the hadiths?” C. 8. replies urging C. 2. 
to decide which path she takes. “I will leave the group if I am obliged to follow 
a specific school.” C. 2. responds that “You are not obliged to follow a specific 
school but you have to respect that we follow the Hanafi school.”
C. 5. adds that she found an opinion which says that celebration is accepted 
but only without candles because when the candles are blown off people usually 
formulate wish which is wrong. Then she quotes Quran 60:1 and explains it that 
imitating non-believers is shirk (polytheism). C. 2. reflects on this refusing the 
idea that blowing off a candle is always accompanied by a wish. C. 5. posts in 
attachment the verse in question scanned. In her response C. 4. asks if  candles are 
mentioned in it explicitly. C.5.’s answer is “No.” She goes on citing an opinion in 
English which states that “celebrating such an occasion is nothing but an imita-
tion of Kuffars, while a Muslim has to be distinguished from them in all aspects. 
Imitating Kuffars and trying to look like them is Haram. Rasullulah (s.a.w.s) has 
said, ‘Whosoever impersonates a nation (other than Islam) will be (resurrected) 
from them on the day of judgment’. (Sunan Abu Dawud)” C. 8. reacts saying that 
“You had better follow the Quran and the Sunna and not others”.  C. 5. copies a 
reference to a Shi‘i opinion from islamquest.net to which C. 8. reacts that the Shi‘a 
should mind their own business because they neglect many rules and have prac-
tices that do not accord with the Quran. The discussion ends here.
The debate is one of the longest posts in the Facebook group, it consists of 
some heated arguments and also a whole range of topics. The need for explaining 
terms such as bid’a, concepts like ‘strictness in religion’ and Salafism, the refer-
ence to Wikipedia, unfamiliarity with the text of the Quran and the hadith corpus 
signal a clear deficit in religious knowledge from the part of the discussants. This 
is further proved by their incapacity to differentiate “custom” from dogma (like 
in the case of fasting on Thursdays which is a sunna), to define the criteria of 
credibility (whom can be considered as knowledgeable) and the problematic of 
interpreting the sacred sources. 
At least three trends can be distinguished in the debate. The followers of the 
Hanafi school (C. 2; C. 4; C. 6.) combine reason with tradition in stressing that 
since there is no explicit hadith dedicated to this problem, celebrating birthday 
cannot be regarded as religious concern. The representative of the Hanbali (C. 5.) 
line gives special weight to the Saudi customs, and emphatic, though selectively, 
about the Sunna of the Prophet. She shows an ambiguous attitude towards qiyas, 
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analogical reasoning, accepting it in defining birthday celebration as imitation of 
a Western custom which is forbidden but hinting at that without candles it is pos-
sible. The Salafi lady (C. 8.) urges literalism – what is not mentioned in the sacred 
texts is borrowed custom therefore it is forbidden – condemns the following of 
specific madhhabs, gives special weight to the scholar living in Medina, argues in a 
polemic style with sectarian undertone – and displays overtly negative comments 
about the Shi‘a.
Due to the differences in the rules of reasoning their respective arguments 
are not convincing for the others. Any argument for and against therefore lacks 
evidentiary value. Quests for consensus includes referring to Turks, Afghans, 
Kurds, Saudis as born Muslims, whose opinion matters, surfing the Internet for 
accessible opinion, inquiry into the background of the websites, and references 
to the Prophet as a role model. The participants make efforts to provide argu-
ments from their own resources but the need for a decisive, authoritative opin-
ion is omnipresent in the discussion. The statement that in fact makes the whole 
debate futile is made by one of the Hanafi participants, saying that once C. 1. has 
made her choice in marriage, she has to follow the customs of her husband. Here 
too, we can detect the conviction that a person has freedom of choice in choosing 
a spouse as well as a madhhab. However, with no accessible religious authority 
present, this vests the husband, a born Muslim with authoritative power over the 
wife, who is a convert.
3) Female beauty care
Following a dress code and applying approved methods in beauty care is a moral 
issue in Islam. For women whose mothers and sisters are not Muslims and the 
only best practice available is that of the customs in the husband’s family, argu-
ing for a treatment that affects their body affects their sense of femininity as well 
as their sense of morality. Shaping one’s eyebrow is a crucial point in beauty care 
since Muslim dress code in Europe generally leaves the eye and the eyebrow 
uncovered.  
In the debate over what forms of beauty treatment are applicable to this part 
of the body one of the participants exposed a long discourse dedicated to the 
methodology of interpreting hadiths. She starts her comment by stating that 
“[…] the fact that Islam is a message for all humankind and valid un-
til the end of times does not mean the all the technical inventions are 
described in its sacred sources. The Quran calls us to use our reason, 
and thus we can tell the prayer before starting a journey by car origi-
nally told before riding a steed, or place the fork on the right side of 
the plate since the Prophet instructed us to eat with the right hand.
The scientific method applied in these cases is called qiyas that is 
analogy which is applied by scholars. Only scholars can apply qiyas 
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because they know what aspects must be considered […] For exam-
ple the person who translated this hadith and placed the term ‘facial 
hair’ in brackets, made a mistaken qiyas […] The prophet meant here 
only the eyebrow and not facial hair in general which can be a seri-
ous problem for non-European women. […] 
And now comes the possibility of various qiyas being present. Ac-
cording to one scholar extracting eyebrow hair is haram, therefore 
other solutions such as oxidising or colouring is possible. Yes, it also 
changes the features of the face but not definitely. Also, if the point 
was not changing facial features, then dying hair was also haram, but 
on the contrary, it is advised. The explanation is not part of the hadith 
so we don’t do it only because the Prophet prohibited it, and we do 
not search for the logic behind. It is the same with pork meat. We 
know that it is unhealthy but we do not eat because it is unhealthy 
but because Allah prohibited it. Other scholars used other ways of 
reasoning [in condemning colouring because of the potential injuries 
it can cause]. 
So, how can we, ordinary Muslims, decide which scholar is right? 
If the opinion of both are in the confines of Islam, we cannot criticise 
them. We have to choose one of them – because they are based on 
knowledge – and follow it without inventing a third opinion from 
our own resources. The scholars will be rewarded for their knowl-
edge and we will be rewarded for using our reason in choosing the 
opinion which can be better applied to our situation. But we cannot 
criticise those who follow the other opinion for it would mean criti-
cising the scholar whose knowledge is much deeper than ours.”
The discourse reveals a continuous tension between reason and obedience. The 
discussant supposes a lack of knowledge regarding the rules of interpretation, 
and tries to highlight the difference between right and wrong uses of analogy. 
Here again the starting point is that the first choice can be based on rational 
consideration. That said, there are various authorities who can be considered as 
Islamic and therefore can be emulated. The definition of “Islamic” is however 
missing from the reflection. 
Diversity and the possibility of making a rational choice impresses the convert 
and convinces him / her that Islamic practice is indeed adaptable to the mod-
ern and even post-modern context. Moreover, the first rational choice exempts 
the faithful from further pensiveness.  The twist inherent in this logic leads the 
writer to two conclusions. First, every faithful is obliged to follow one of the 
many Islamic authorities present in the market of virtual or mosque based fatwa-
factories. Second, the diversity – which is the guarantee of flexibility and adapt-
ability (or the illusion of it) – has to be respected and the credibility of the vari-
ous authorities who are branded as Islamic – supposing that there is a “standard 
Islam” – should not be contested.
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Conclusion
Division can sometimes make the community stronger. The multiplicity of reli-
gious authorities create an image of plurality, and flexibility so important for con-
verts the majority of whom cannot immediately get rid of modernist approaches 
and reason based decision making. Fragmentation is concomitant to the Sunni 
authority and the Muslim authority in general. It allows the incorporation of the 
stakeholders as religious actors, through charisma, action and reproduction. The 
fragmentation of the field of Sunni authority is a resource for the different actors 
of the field. It allows the multiplication of mosques, associations, interpretative 
sub-communities, etc. 
This multiplicity of authorities in Hungarian Islam appears at first without 
religious and social logic. However, not providing a clear answer to the ques-
tion “Who is in charge?” probably has a purpose: to allow the field to expand 
further. As with any cultural or social dynamic, tension, shifting, confrontations 
and mutual consolidations take place in the Hungarian Muslim community. For, 
the community, and in particular influential clans and families, creates Islamic 
authority. 
The four legitimacies we examined – charisma, reproduction, knowledge and 
action – as sources of authority appear to be communitarian. Choosing the right 
opinion and authority to follow presupposes religious knowledge. Since most 
converts lack such knowledge and familiarity with the cultural variants of Islam, 
they rely on the community to help them make their way in the mess of – often 
self-proclaimed – authorities. 
To be a successful and good Muslim, one has to choose and follow one author-
ity and thus subordinate oneself to the community of his followers. Other opin-
ions and authorities – if considered as Islamic – are accepted as manifestations 
of the diversity of Islam which in turn makes the community stronger. The rea-
son that legitimacy is communitarian lies in the functioning of the community 
as a moral economy. As the community lives a subsistence mode of action and 
thought, it needs religion – diverse and powerful as it is – as a moral justification, 
a guarantee for the viability of this moral economy.  
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